I'm trying to remember which sources I'm slicing and dicing to say this, but my understanding of the 1918 Spring Offensive was that its achievements had to be balanced against its strategic and even operational aimlessness, especially as it evolved. That is, it occupied such giant swathes of territory in part because it was a offensive waged as if the occupation of square kilometers of France was a militarily useful end in itself. I'd be interested to hear a clever counterfactual all about a speedy peace in the East and XYZ divisions being ready to attack the French at suchandsuch a date, with reference to conditions ABC in the French morale crisis, but given American intervention, the by then huge British and Commonwealth armies, and the sort of logistical / fort-reducing problems that even a spectacular German offensive would get bogged down with, I'm not sure why Clemenceau would ever ask for an armistice in late-1917 early 1918. As with 1914 that isn't to minimize the panic or operational pants-shitting that the Allies actually went through in 1918, or that it might have been worse. As a second year undergrad I wrote a paper arguing that Schlieffen should've called for violating Dutch neutrality through the Limburg panhandle, on the grounds that it would've relieved the logistical mess (?!) and made the need to assault the Liege fortresses less of a military/political hair-trigger, the latter of which is at least arguable in an post-hoc undergrad logic sort of way.